Robert E. Norton, The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1995), ch. 3, 114-118:
Most historians have assumed that Winckelmann’s often repeated exhortation—that “the only way for us to become great, indeed, if it is possible, to become inimitable, is to imitate the ancients’—was meant to apply to the imitation of art works alone. Even if Winckelmann had in fact been thinking exclusively of art, the German writers who came after him in fact understood his words in a much broader, although very specific, sense. What Winckelmann intended, or at any rate was taken to mean, was that his fellow Germans should imitate the Greeks not just in creating works of art, but in everything else they did. At first, to be sure, a much more realistic and detached sentiment prevailed in the German appreciation of Greece, an attitude one finds, for example, in Herder’s Ueber die neuere Deutsche Litteratur of 1767. “Of course we can learn much from the Greeks,” he cautiously advised as he witnessed the first wave of Winckelmannian enthusiasm wash over Germany, “of course we can take them as models; but let us make imitations that are appropriate to our time: otherwise everything will become a caricature!” But in later decades, German writers and artists came to believe that it was possible not just to create imitations of “Greek” works of art, but to become in every way like the Greeks themselves—or at least like the unhistorical and idealized image they had selectively constructed of the Attic character. But this practice did not of course run counter to Winckelmann’s intentions. In their efforts to recreate themselves according to their notion of Greek humanity, late-eighteenth-century German intellectuals actually heeded the deepest meaning of his call by beginning to regard and treat themselves, in effect, as living works of art. As if to improve on Pope’s well-known phrase, Goethe had claimed that the proper aim of the Greeks had been not merely to study “Man,” but to create and portray “beautiful humanity.” To take the Greeks as a model thus meant not just to imitate their works of art but to internalize what were thought to be their essential attributes. The German attempt to revivify Greece entailed at its core the endeavor to become, as they ardently believed the Greeks to have been, “beautiful human beings.”
Residing at the center of this extraordinary development in late-eighteenth- century German culture there was a particular concept—or rather a constellation of concepts that went by a single name—defining the highest human aspirations. And it was an idea that rested on explicitly aesthetic foundations. But the Greek revival took root in soil that had been prepared by the other philosophical, religious, and political forces that we have already witnessed here. Having been given official sanction through the auspices of the newly reorganized academy in Berlin, British moral philosophy and especially its insistence on the “beauty of virtue” had begun to find an interested and sympathetic German audience by the 1760s at the latest. There was also a more native receptivity, since most intellectuals in German speaking lands had been raised in Pietist households. Many of them had early grown accustomed to thinking of morality not only in terms of a complete inner transformation but moreover as a process in which one makes the soul more beautiful in the eyes of God. By the middle decade of the eighteenth century in Germany, an idea of beauty that went beyond the sphere of art alone had thus assumed a place in the very center of the collective imagination. No longer merely the means of making one’s external environment more pleasant or merely bearable, beauty was becoming the measure by which the ultimate aim of humanity itself was judged. The new contribution to this larger equation, the specifically Greek element in this eclectic mixture, was the peculiar Hellenic concept of kalokagathia.
The urge to uncover the historical substratum of modern culture, which had provided one of the original motives for the eighteenth-century interest in Greece, had also been operative at the first moment in which this word occurred in the Enlightenment context. Berkeley, we remember, notes in his Alciphron that the earl of Shaftesbury’s ideas owed more than he admitted to this concept. The Irish dean was thus the first to establish the historical connection between contemporary ethics and ancient philosophy which would become explicit several decades later. The word and its implications appear to have first entered German thought at a conscious level in 1758 by way of a short and early work by Wieland, “Plan einer Akademie zu Bildung des Verstandes und des Herzens junger Leute” (Plan for an academy for the cultivation of the heart and mind of young people). Although the general focus of Wieland’s essay on pedagogical issues was fairly typical of its time, his particular perspective on the problem was, as we will see, entirely new.
It already amounted to a significant innovation that Wieland derived the authority for his educational reform not simply from the writers of antiquity (which had usually meant, as we know, the Romans) but specifically and primarily from the Greeks. Wieland claimed that “their entire method of education and instruction was very different from our modern ways,” and it becomes clear that he considered these “modern ways” in every way inferior to the practices of the ancient Greeks.” Instead of forcing their pupils to fill their minds with grammar and empty words, the Greeks trained their youth, Wieland explained, to exercise and develop all of their physical and mental abilities, for the Greeks believed that we come into this world, so to speak, as “embryos” that must first be formed (ausgebildet) into human beings. Without this necessary discipline, the Greeks felt that both body and soul would remain weak and indolent and that the whole organism would lack the coordination, agility, and strength (again, in both the physical and moral senses) to achieve happiness and success in life. Central to the Greeks’ educational efforts, Wieland concluded, was the attempt to produce young men (women were not part of their plan) who embodied this latter ideal:
The goal, therefore, of their education was to form or cultivate [bilden] their young citizens into that which they termed kalokagathia. By this word they understood all of the excellences and perfections that distinguish a free and noble human being from a slave and from a human-like animal; it encompassed all of the qualities and talents that elevate and beautify a person and make one fit to fulfill a noble role in life. To this end, which alone is worthy of human nature, they inculcated in their youth as early as possible a taste for the beautiful and the good, along with the best moral and political notions.
Here Wieland presented the essential ingredients of his pedagogical plan with the clarity and simplicity that later became recognized as the distinctive hallmarks of his style. Influenced as much (and arguably more) by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as by Plato and Xenophon, Wieland freely combined concepts he had borrowed from a variety of modern and ancient sources. Conspicuous throughout the essay, for example, is Wieland’s insistence on the practical emphasis of Greek philosophy and his repeated contention that education and moral instruction could not be separated. Rather than indulge in “clever speculations,” the Greeks, Wieland claimed, “wanted to raise virtuous citizens for the state, they saw philosophy as a discipline for the soul [Gemüt], which is necessary for every person, because everyone has ideas that he must learn to enlighten, inclinations to guide to the best final purpose and to their proper objects, emotions to control, faults to correct, and virtues to enhance”. Although this sounds more like a descrip- tion of the eighteenth-century estimation of the function performed by philosophy, that was partly Wieland’s point. He approached Greek thought—or what he took to be Greek thought—with the same practical attitude he had praised in it. For he did not suggest that the pupils of his academy study the Greeks with the sole aim of acquiring knowledge about the past for its own sake. Rather, they should apply the lessons they learned from the Greeks to their own lives, with the immediate purpose of improving their moral, and not simply their intellectual, constitution.
As the full title of the “Plan einer Akademie” clearly states, Wieland thought that the moral betterment he proposed would require cultivation of both the “understanding” and the “heart.” He held that it was necessary to appeal to the emotional as well as the rational faculties of those one wanted to improve. The most expedient and important instrument in fulfilling this twofold demand, and one that he thought suffered from scandalous neglect in the Germany of his time, was the art of speaking and writing well. “Plato,” Wieland exclaimed, “was called the Homer of philosophers because of his sublime eloquence”. Wieland considered language unique because it was the only vehicle for communicating the ideas that could be grasped by the rational mind alone; yet it could also be crafted into beautiful forms and hence appeal to the sentiment as well. And it is here that Wieland most obviously drew on the contemporary theoretical resources that had grown up around the concept of moral beauty. Making this connection explicit by mentioning Shaftesbury by name, Wieland continued his discussion of Greek education by stressing the importance of taste not just in judging works of art, but also in making the practical decisions of everyday existence. “They well knew,” he said of the Greeks,
how closely good taste—this lively and delicate ability to perceive the True, Harmonious, or Beautiful by a kind of feeling and inner sense—how closely this faculty was related to sound reason, to the regularity of the soul, and to the politeness of manners; and how it is practically impossible to possess the latter qualities, as much as they belong to humanity, without the former. They thus required of a noble and well-bred boy that he be kalos kai agathos, a Virtuoso, as the most brilliant and finest of all modern writers, Shaftesbury, expresses it.
Instruction in all of the arts and sciences, then, with constant reference to their practical consequence and use, was supposed to establish an equilibrium in the breast of the pupil, a balance of mind and heart, of reason and feeling, that would be pleasant to behold and beneficial in its effect. Such a person would be, that is, both beautiful and good—or would embody, in a word, what the Greeks had called kalokagathia.
*References to pages dropped. Photos from and for Glyptothek, Munich, taken on 29 Oct. 2026.





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